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PREFACE
The Asian Business History Centre was established in 1996 in recognition of scholarly growing interest in 
the business traditions of Asia. Its primary aim is to strengthen links with international research centres as 
well as with the business community in both Australia and Asia. Lecture series and conferences sponsored 
by the Centre provide a forum for our staff, students and international affiliates. The Centre supports an 
Occasional Paper series on Asian Business History and the Asian Business History Monograph series. Both 
series will be of particular relevance to the business and academic communities involved in or looking to 
expand their activities in Asia.
The Asian Business History Occasional Paper Series was established in 1998 to publish some of the papers 
presented at The University of Queensland Public Lecture Series on Asian Business History. A full list of 
lectures delivered follows this paper.
Occasional papers in Asian Business History are published for the purpose of academic discussion. Papers 
should be regarded as preliminary work in progress. Suggestions and comments should be addressed directly 
to the author.
Chi Kong Lai 
Editor and Director 
Asian Business History Centre 
The University of Queensland
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Deflation and the Mass Peasant Uprisings in 
Mid-I9th Century China
Yeh-chien Wang
In the middle of the 19th century China witnessed a series of mass peasant uprisings of 
which the most virulent and devastating was the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64).1 It struck 
the most productive and richest part of the country - the lower and middle Yangzi 
valley, particularly the Yangzi delta-and almost toppled the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). 
To account for the gargantuan social upheaval and other outbursts of lesser consequence 
there have been, in scholarly journals and general textbooks alike, two principal theses, 
namely, the Malthusian thesis and the Marxist. The former considers the crises a classic 
case of population explosion while the latter sees them in terms of class conflict.
From the late 17th century through the 18th China enjoyed a prolonged peace 
and the number of people multiplied. By the middle of the 19th century it had risen to 
the neighbourhood of 400 million. Given the traditional farming technology, the output 
from the land cultivable simply cannot, according to the Malthusian school of thought, 
sustain the huge increase in population. Consequently, war and famine become 
inevitable for restoring the balance between man and land.2
The Marxist historians attribute, on the other hand, the crises essentially to social 
polarisation. They maintain that Chinese society was characterised by the conflict 
between landlords and peasants throughout the imperial period. The landlords owned 
greater part of farm lands, the most important form of wealth in agricultural society, and 
controlled the state. They exploited the peasants by charging high rent and high interest 
and by imposing heavy taxes. Under these circumstances, the latter found it increasingly 
difficult to hold on to the little pieces of land they had owned and many turned 
vagabond. In despair they periodically burst out en mass against the landlords and the 
state. The mid-19th century social upheavals were, in view of the Marxist school, 
nothing but reactions of those uprooted peasants against the establishment.3
My research on food supply and grain prices in Qing China has made me feel 
increasingly dissatisfied with the Malthusian thesis. First, while China’s population 
registered an unprecedented increase during the 18th and early 19th centuries, cultivated 
acreage and even yield per acre rose likewise.4 The most dynamic feature o f Qing 
economy is in my view the concomitant development o f farm lands in what I call “the 
developing area” and o f industry, commerce, and banking services in “the developed 
area”, each complimenting the other. Not only did the former absorbed a large number 
o f migrants out o f the more densely populated provinces but also generated a steady 
flow o f surplus grain to the latter. In return, the latter supplied manufactured goods 
(textiles in particular), capital, and technical know-how as w ell.5 Instead o f diminishing 
the flow o f surplus rice out o f “the developing area” appears to have been growing in 
the early 19th century.6 There is no clear indication that food supply was then failing 
short nationwide.
Second, in a huge and topograghically diverse empire like Qing China where 
crops, climate, and rainfall varied from one part o f the country to another, we would 
find in vain that it was flee from drought, flood, or other calamities even for a single 
year. In an historical survey o f the frequencies o f natural calamities and their spatial 
distribution for the Daoguang period (1821-50) one study concludes that the calamities
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were multifarious, continuous, and extensive and therefore contributed significantly to 
the Taiping Rebellion.7 To test its finding I have made use of the statistics on the 
distribution of flood and drought during the last five centuries, which were constructed, 
on the basis of information collected from official records, local gazetteers, private 
diaries, and data of rainfall, etc. by Chinese scientists from the Central Meteorological 
Institute and other research institutions. They designated for observation 120 stations, 
each covering one or two prefectures, throughout the country and classified the 
precipitation of each station into five grades as follows: 1 very wet, 2 wet, 3 normal, 4 
dry, and 5 very dry. Grades 1 and 5 signify the occurrence of flood and drought 
respectively, and 3 denotes normal precipitation for farming. Each year a station is 
assigned a grade should information be available. The data are nonetheless far from 
complete. In Table 1 1 have selected 17-18 stations as a sample for analysis of extent of 
natural calamities for the period of 1821-50 in comparison with 1741-70 (a period of 
high prosperity), 1638-41, and 1876-78 (both being periods of famine).8 The data for 
grades 1 and 5 are combined, so are those for grades 2 and 4. The frequency 
distribution does show that there are somewhat more natural calamites in the early 19th 
century than in the high Qing; for flood and drought are 4 per cent higher in 1821-50 
than in 1741-70, those of minor nature 3 per cent higher, and normal precipitation 
comprises 37 per cent against 44 per cent.
The condition of 1821-50 is, however, a far cry from years of dreadful famines 
before the fall of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) and in the late 1870s. In those years a 
large part of the country was blanketed by severe droughts and tens of millions of 
people died of starvation, disease, or violence”.9 If we leave aside the categories of mild 
flooding and drought which are ill-defined, the contrast between 1741-70 and 1821-50 
on the one hand and 1638-41 and 1876-78 on the other becomes all the more clear. For 
in the latter cases flood and drought account for more than a third or even a half of total 
frequencies and normality merely a tenth or fifth. We must see things in historical 
perspective; considered alone the extent of calamities in the period of 1821-50 is likely 
to be exaggerated. The period is, by and large, close to 1741-70 in terms of major or 
minor calamities and in normality as well.
Table 1: Frequency Distribution of Flood and Drought in China (figures in percentage)
Period Flood & Drought Mild Flooding & 
Drought
Normal
Precipitation
Total (%)
1741-70 14 42 44 100
1821-50 18 45 37 100
1639-41 53 37 10 100
1876-78 35 47 18 100
Note: Statistics are computed from data of 18 stations as follows: Taiyuan, Beijing, Shijiazhuang, 
Zhengzhou, Jinan, Xian, Hangzhong, Hefei, Shanghai, Anqing, Ningbo, Jiujiang, Ganzhou, Yichang, 
Wuhan, Yoyang, Changsha, Wuzhou. But Wuzhou and Yichang are taken off for 1639-41 and 1876-78 
respectively because of missing data.
Source: Zhongyang qixiangju qixiang koxue yanjiuso, comp., Zhongguo jin  wubainian hanlao fenbu tuji 
(Maps on die distribution of drought and flood in China for the last five hundred years), Beijing, Titu 
chubanshe, 1981, pp. 320-332.
Third, when a society suffers from subsistence crisis, food supply fails far short 
o f demand and grain prices tend to skyrocket. But grain prices were declining in the 
country instead for the two decades prior to the Taiping Rebellion (see Fig. 2). 
Although the fall in prices then was to a great extent caused by silver exodus as a result 
o f growing opium traffic, it should be noted that not only did prices o f farm products 
decline but they declined relatively to those o f non-farm goods (see Table 4). We shall
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have more to say about changes in relative prices. I see little evidence to support the 
contention that the problem of food shortage was looming up at the time.
The Marxists assert that land ownership was increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of landlords from the 18th century onward and that the tension between peasants 
and landlords in China had reached the breaking point by the mid-19th century. To be 
sure, one can find virtually in any age of Chinese history anecdotal or impressionistic 
evidence left by contemporary scholars or officials deploring the accumulation of land 
by the rich and powerful at the expense of poor peasants. We should point out, 
however, that owing to the custom of division of property by heirs, extravagance, and 
mismanagement, dispersing of property occurred along with accumulation throughout 
most of the imperial period. No official statistics were ever compiled on the distribution 
of land ownership nationwide or locally; nor have 1 seen any solid study on changes of 
the distribution of land ownership. It is not clear to me just when and where the trend 
toward concentration was stronger than déconcentration and whether land ownership 
was more concentrated in the mid-19th century than, say, in the 18th. The most credible 
survey of China’s farm lands before World War II, which was done under the direction 
of John Lossing Buck at Nanking University, indicates that about a half of Chinese 
peasants were independent farm owners, 30-40 per cent part owners, and only one sixth 
of them tenants without land.10 This does not bear out that ownership of farm lands in 
China was excessively concentrated in comparison with other countries.
On the other hand, since most of the Taiping followers were poor peasants, that 
they should leave home and join the rebels demonstrated beyond doubt their 
disaffection toward the state and the rich. Nonetheless, we are not sure that peasants 
were losing their land; even less do we know whether their economic hardship (loss of 
property included) was primarily brought about by landlord exploitation. In any case, 
people may become impoverished and discontented even without landlord exploitation. 
Can we rule out other causes that could make their living so unbearable that they saw no 
better alternative but taking up arms?
To be sure, no single factor may provide adequate account for the mass uprisings 
such as those that happened in mid-19th century China. Nevertheless, I find that the 
widespread social discontent had a great deal to do with the monetary deflation at the 
time. Historians in and out o f China fail, it appears to me, to see the dire consequence of 
the working o f “the invisible hand” upon the Chinese peasants. For the greater part o f 
the Qing period China’s monetary system was close to what is known as parallel 
bimetallism. Under this system monetary media consisted o f silver and copper cash. 
Silver in whatever form and copper cash issued by the government were circulating side 
by side in the market. While silver was generally used in wholesale trade or large-sum 
transactions, copper cash for retail trade and daily wage payment. The rate o f exchange 
between the two was officially fixed at one tael to 1,000 cash, but in fact changed from 
one time to another and from one place to another. In this paper prices are stated in 
silver, unless noted otherwise.11
Primarily because o f accelerating growth o f illicit trade in opium, China incurred 
large amounts o f deficit in the 1830s and 40s. The result was a continuous and massive 
drain o f silver out o f the country.12 What made the situation worse was the spread o f 
counterfeit coins and debased coins that increasingly pushed silver out o f circulation in 
consequence o f the working o f the Grasham’s Law. As the amount o f silver circulating 
in the market kept decreasing, prices o f most commodities in terms o f silver plummeted. 
At the same time, the exchange rate between silver and copper cash climbed up almost 
steadily (see Table 2 and Figure 1). Listed in Table 3 are grain prices o f five prefectures 
(rice prices in Suzhou, Quanzhou, and Wuchang, wheat prices in Huaian and Tianjin), 
their averages and indexes, along with the indexes o f  retail prices in Daliu Township 
and the suburb o f Beijing for 1826-52. Take Suzhou, the largest rice market in the
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country, for example, rice prices stood close to 3 taels per shi in 1834 but dropped to 
1.32 taels in 1852.13 In Tianiin, the largest commercial port in the north, wheat prices 
declined by nearly a half over the same period. In 1848-49 a good part of the Yangzi 
valley was ravaged by flood; consequently rice prices shot up in the south. But they 
turned downward again in the early 50s. Although some of the data are incomplete, all 
demonstrate a falling trend from the 1830s. Given 1833-35 as base, grain prices on the 
average had dropped to 77 in 1850 and further to 64 in 1852, retail prices to 66 and 64 
in the two northern marts by 1850. It may be then stated with a measure of confidence 
that prices fell by about a third in the country over the two decades before 1853, the year 
the Taiping rebels took the important city of Nanjing (see Figure 3).
When grain prices declined, prices of farmland tumbled. Unfortunately we have 
little solid statistics on farm prices. Two cases are cited here for illustration. Based on 
the contracts of land transactions of a clan in Yuanhe County in Jiangsu and the record 
of land acquisitions of another clan in Jiaxing County in Zhejiang, Kathryn Bernhardt 
produced a chart showing unmistakably a precipitous fall in farm prices from the 1820s 
to 40s (see Figure 4). Her data of prices are, it should be noted, expressed in copper 
cash. Even more conspicuous would be the slump of farm market if prices are stated in 
silver instead of copper cash, for the exchange rate between the two moved up 
substantially in favour of silver over the same period (see Table 2 and Figure 1).
Probably more revealing was the case of land transactions of a landlord in 
Huizhou. The unit of land stated in the contracts was the “fiscal mu” instead of the 
actual mu (the unit of land approximately one sixth of an acre). A fiscal mu means a 
tract of land paying a fixed amount of tax no matter how large is its size. Suppose for 
instance, that the tax is 0.3 tael for a fiscal mu. If the land of the best quality is assessed 
at 0.3 tael per mu and that of low-quality at 0.1 per mu. Then, one mu of the best- 
quality land and three mu of the low-quality land are considered the same as a fiscal mu. 
Since prices of farm lands of different quality may vary greatly even in a single locality, 
the fiscal mu would be a better measure of changes in land value than the actual mu, 
particularly in case the size of sample is small. From 1830s through 50s the landlord 
had 40 transactions in land acquisition. Based on these transactions, Chang Yuyi 
derived the average prices of a fiscal mu as follows: 41.31 taels for 1830-39, 31.91 for 
1840-49, and 19.55 for 1850-55.14 His finding indicates that farm prices dropped by 
more than a half in Huizhou over the quarter century.
The drain o f silver and fall in prices weakened practically all lines o f trade and 
employment. The Yangzi River valley has long been the richest part o f China and the 
river with its tributaries and connecting lakes was the foremost line o f transportation for 
inter-regional trade in Ming-Qing times. From his personal investigation o f the 
business conditions in Suzhou and Hankou, the two most important entrepots along the 
river, Lin Zexu, Governor-General o f Huguang, reported to the throne in 1838 that sales 
o f various commodities had decreased in value by about a half as compared with two or 
three decades before.15 By 1852 Suzhou was so depressed that “all great and wealthy 
merchants have gone bankrupt”, so observed Feng Guifeng, a prominent local scholar, 
“and business o f all kinds has diminished by 50 to 60 per cent”.16
On the coast business activities slackened likewise. In 1845, Pan Shien, Acting 
President o f the Board o f Revenue, said in a memorial that in the past junk boats from 
Fujian and Guangdong, usually several tens or more than a hundred in number, came 
annually to Tianjin for trade, but because o f dwindling profit the number kept 
decreasing in recent years.17 In the same year, Jin Zhi, Tartar General in Fuzhou and 
Concurrently Superintendent o f Customs o f Fujian, stated that since 1835 local 
economy had been declining and merchants went bankrupt one after another.18
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Table 2: The Exchange Rate between Silver and Copper Cash
(Unit: No. of cash per tael)
Year Daliu, Zhili Ningbo and Shanghai Jianwei, Suchuan
1826 1,271 1,187
1827 1,341 1,220
1828 1,339 1,287
1829 1,380 1,327
1830 1,365 1,346 1,330
1831 1,388 1,351 1,280
1832 1,387 1,400 1,170
1833 1,363 1,290
1834 1,356 1,422 1,350
1835 1,420 1,490
1836 1,487 1,473 1,420
1837 1,559
1838 1,638 1,535 1,460
1839 1,679
1840 1,644 1,570 1,400
1841 1,547
1842 1,572 1,877 1,440
1843 1,656 1,610
1844 1,724
1845 2,025
1846 2,208 1,720
1847 2,167 1,610
1848 2,299 1,610
1849 2,355
1850 2,230 2,077
1851 1,975
1852 2,089
1853 2,220
Note: The original data for Ningbo and Shanghai are stated in terms of copper cash per silver dollars. They are
converted into exchange rates at the rate of one dollar to 0.72 tael.
Sources: Yan Zhongping, comp., Zhongguo jindai jingjishi tongji zilao xuanji (Selected statistical materials on the economy 
history of modem China), Beijing: Kexue chubanshe, 1975, p. 37; Yinxian tongzhi (Gazetteer of Yin County), 1935, “Shihuo zhi”, 
pp. 219-229; Jianwei xianzhi (Gazetteer of Jianwei County), 1937, “Jingji zhi”, pp. 28-29; Zhongguo jindai huobishi ziliao 
(Materials on the monetary history of modem China), Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1964, First Collection, 1.56, 80, 118-119, 324-, 
443; North China Herald, 5 September, 23 November and 28 December (1950); 4,11 and 25 January, 1 and 22Februaiy, 8 March, 
5,12 and 26 April, 10 May, 21 and 28 June, 20 September (1851); 1 and 15 March, 18 September (1852)
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Table 3: Fluctuation of Prices in Early Nineteenth-century China, 1826-1852
U n it: taels  per  shi Index  N o : 1 8 3 3 - 1835= 100*
Year Suzhou Quanzhou Wuchang Huaian Tianjin Average Index No. of Retail Prices
Grain
Prices
Daliu,
Zbili
Suburb of 
Beijing
1826 2 .28 2 .1 7 2 .05 2 .94 2 .49 2 .39 95 101
1827 2 .17 2.05 2.05 2.66 2 .54 2 .29 92 93
1828 2 .18 1.89 2 .08 2.53 2.36 2.21 88 93
1829 2 .22 2 .20 2 .46 2.01 2 .2 2 89 84 75
1830 2 .28 2 .1 7 2 .58 2 .35 94 79
1831 2 .52 2 .08 2 .46 2.11 2 .29 92 80
1832 2 .6 0 2 .29 2 .2 0 2 .02 2 .34 2 .29 92 87 99
1833 2 .7 7 2 .6 0 2.15 2 .24 2 .59 2 .4 7 99 97
1834 2 .96 2 .73 2.21 2 .56 2.53 2 .6 0 104 105
1835 2 .3 7 2 .6 7 2 .15 2 .43 2.63 2 .45 98 98
1836 2 .25 2 .7 2 2 .14 2 .27 2 .65 2.41 96 91 101
1837 2 .1 7 2 .6 0 2.11 2.61 2 .3 7 95
1838 2 .08 2 .2 9 1.89 2 .62 2 .2 2 89
1939 2 .24 2 .12 2 .06 2 .59 2 .25 90
1840 2.51 2.11 2.45 2 .69 2 .4 4 98
1841 2 .57 2.01 1.96 2 .29 2 .36 2 .2 4 90 81
1842 2.55 1.94 1.98 2.55 2 .00 2 .2 0 88 78
1843 2 .2 6 1.97 1.58 2 .26 2 .03 2 .02 81 76
1844 2 .3 8 2 .23 1.56 2.33 2.01 2 .1 0 84 73
1845 2 .2 4 2 .16 1.51 2 .0 0 1.98 1.98 79 63 71
1846 1.91 1.93 1.53 1.80 1.69 1.79 71
1847 1.95 1.99 1.55 1.85 1.60 1.79 72
1848 1.98 1.86 1.48 1.99 1.66 1.79 72
1849 2 .2 0 1.81 1.87 1.98 1.68 1.91 76
1850 2 .3 9 1.94 1.71 2 .1 4 1.49 1.93 77 66 64
1851 2 .1 8 1.95 1.38 2 .13 1.29 1.79 71
1852 1.32 1.90 1.36 2.13 1.33 1.61 6 4
Average for 1832 and 1836 as 100 for suburb o f Beijing.
Sources: (1) Grain price data are collected at the First Historical Archives in Beijing and die National 
Palace Museum in Taipei; those for Tianjin are provided by Professor Lillian M. Li o f Swarthmore 
College. (2) For index numbers o f Daliu and suburb o f Beijing see Table 4 o f  this essay and my article 
“The Secular Trend o f  Prices during the Ch’ing Period”, Journal o f Chinese Studies o f  the Chinese 
University o f  Hong Kong, 1 ,2  (1972), pp. 354-357.
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Figure 1: The Exchange Rate between Silver and Copper (Ratio: number of cash per tael)
Daliu, zhili — □— Ningbo and Shanghai - -+ - - Jianwei, Sichuan
Figure 2: Grain Prices in China, 1826-1852 (Price: taels per shi)
QuMkM -------- Wuckai, h .......
Figure 3: Index Number of Prices in China, 1826-1852 (1833-35=100) 
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The plight of salt merchants was another clear sign of business contraction at the 
time. Salt had long been a government monopoly and the salt tax ranked next only to 
the land tax as a source of revenue for most of time. In the Qing period the imperial 
court issued licenses to a limited number of merchants to sell salt in designated areas in 
return for a specified quota of tax payment. The most privileged were those in charge of 
distributing salt produced in the Lianghuai. area. Altogether they contributed about a 
third of salt tax in the country. At the height of prosperity there were several hundred 
merchant houses of eminence, each with capital ranging from one to two million taels to 
as much as ten million taels. They were among the wealthiest in the society. In 
addition to paying tax quotas, they contributed tens of million taels to the government 
for celebrating emperor’s birthday, defraying expenses of water control works, military 
expeditions, etc. During the Daoguang period (1821-50), however, most of them 
collapsed. Those who remained in business saw their capital drastically depleted; even 
the most resourceful commanded less than a million taels. For tax quotas were fixed in 
silver while consumers paid for salt in copper cash at retail level. When the value of 
silver appreciated vis-à-vis copper cash, consumers found themselves paying much 
more than before for the same amount of salt. Increasingly they turned to smugglers for 
what they needed; the sale of officially certified salt thus plummeted. In this situation, 
salt merchants suffered heavy losses and many were forced out of business not only in 
Lianghuai but also in the rest of the country.19 Many more cases can be found if one 
cares to look into the literature at the time.
In short, China was beset by rising value of silver, falling prices, and business 
contraction in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. It was in such a state of 
economy that mass peasant uprisings took place in different parts of the country.
Deflation worked against the peasants in several ways: first, prices of 
agricultural goods, grain in particular, declined more than those of non-agricultural 
goods. For the demand for and supply of grain is rather inelastic. Consumers do not eat 
much more simple because of cheaper food. On the other hand, in a pre-modem society 
most peasants have no better alternatives but keep producing what they are used to 
produce even in times of falling grain prices. As such, the terms of trade between farm 
goods (peasants produced) and non-farm goods (they purchased) turned unfavourable to 
peasants in times of deflation. Second, peasants found their income from subsidiary and 
off-season work shrinking. Third, their land tax burden became heavier than ever 
before.
From the 1830s prices in terms o f silver began to fall persistently, and peasants’ 
economic condition became deteriorating. For they had to sell more and more o f what 
they produced to buy the same amount o f what they were used to consume. For 
illustration, let us examine the retail prices presented in Table 4, which were constructed 
by Yan Zhongping and his associates from the raw data o f the account books o f a retail 
store in Daliu Township o f Zhihli Province. Included in the farm goods are rice and 
peanuts, while the non-farm goods were composed o f ten items including four items o f 
iron products, tong-wood oil, writing paper, charcoal, mats, sugar, and wine. Some 
items selected appear to be less than appropriate (eg, rice was not a farm product in the 
north) and data are missing for ten years. Nevertheless, rice and other kinds o f grain are 
competitive in the market; their prices tend to change in the same direction. As indicated 
in the table and portrayed in Figure 5, prices o f both farm goods and non-farm goods 
descended markedly in the 1830s and 40s (moving up in 1850 because o f severe 
flooding along the Yangzi valley), but those o f farm goods decreased more than o f non­
farm goods. Given 1833-35 as base, the index o f the former had by 1850 dropped to 59 
while that o f the latter to 75. Accordingly, the terms o f trade declined to 78 in favour o f 
the non-farm goods. In other words, because o f changes in relative prices peasants
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around Daliu saw their purchasing power reduced by a fifth in a period of less than two 
decades.
To what extent were peasants affected by price changes in other parts of China? I 
have as yet not found compatible data for analysis. But it is worthwhile to note the 
observation left by a contemporary scholar in the 1840s. “In the last decade the crops 
were not particularly plentiful”, said he, “and yet grain prices were rather cheap”. With 
a tael of silver we may purchase two shi of unhusked rice. On the other hand, daily 
household expenses (other than food) have not decreased.20
Table 4: Retail Prices in Daliu township, Zhili Province, 1826-1850 (Base: 1833-35=100)
Prices In Silver Prices in Copper Cash
Y e a r R e ta il  P r ic e s R e ta il P r ic e s  o f  
F a rm  P ro d u c ts
R e ta il  P r ic e s  o f  N o n - 
F a rm  P ro d u c ts
R e ta il P rice s R e ta il  P r ic e s  o f  
F a rm  P ro d u c ts
R e ta il  P r ic e s  o f  N o n - 
F a rm  P ro d u c ts
T e rm s  o f  T ra d e  B etw een  
F a rm  P ro d u c ts  a n d  N o n - 
F a rm  P ro d u c ts
(1) (2 ) (3 ) (4) (5) (6 ) (7) ( 8 H 3 V ( 4 )
1826 101 91 113 93 84 104 81
1827 93 83 103 9 0 81 101 80
1828 93 87 99 9 0 85  - 96 89
1829 84 76 94 84 76 94 81
1830 79 6 9 91 78 68 9 0 75
1831 80 72 90 81 72 90 80
1832 87 81 93 87 82 9 4 87
1833 9 7 94 100 96 93 9 9 94
1834 105 110 9 9 103 108 98 110
1835 98 96 100 101 99 103 96
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
91 87 94 9 8 9 4 101 93
1843 76 6 9 8 4 91 83 101 81
1844 73 6 7 8 0 9 2 84 111 84
1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
63 57 71 93 84 104 80
1850 6 6 5 9 7 5 107 9 5 121 78
Source: Yan Zongping, pp. 37-38.
Next, to earn supplemental income Chinese peasants often engaged in handicraft 
production such as spinning, weaving, raising cocoons, making wooden or bamboo 
tools. They also worked odd jobs in the off-season. It goes without saying that in times 
of deflation when business of all kinds declined, this source of income soon became 
diminishing or was completely cut off. Their handicraft products could find few buyers 
in the market; nor could they find work off farm. For instance, deploring the plight of 
cash-crop farmers Bao Shichen, a scholar knowledgeable in economic affairs, noted in 
1846: “The crops of cocoon and cotton are quite abundant but no peasant can recover 
the cost of his investment. When merchants keep themselves away from trade, the 
livelihood of (peasants) falls in hardship”.21
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Figure 5: Retail Prices in Daliu Township, Zhili Province, 1826-1850 (Prices in Silver)
Index Number: 1833-35=100
Even worse was the rising burden of the land tax while their income was 
diminishing. For understanding this issue I think it necessary to give a brief account of 
the essential features of Qing land tax system. First, the land tax was assessed on the 
basis of land area (eg, so many dollars per acre in Western parlance) instead of land 
yield or land value. But farm lands were in general classified into a number of 
categories depending on the quality of the soil, the topography of the field, the 
accessibility to irrigation and market, and so on. Land of different category was 
assessed at different rate; the higher was the category the higher the rate. The product of 
land area and the rate was the tax quota, which was the target the local government in 
charge of tax collection was required to meet. Second, fixed in the early decades of the 
Qing dynasty, the budget for local administrative expenses was dismally inadequate 
from the beginning and hardly increased over centuries. In order to meet administrative 
expenses local governments throughout the empire added surcharges for every unit of 
tax quota.-Over time the surcharges were gradually increased as population expanded 
and administrative affairs multiplied. There were however no clear regulations on 
surcharges of which the amount depended on precedents and the calculated decision of 
local magistrates, sometimes in consultation with local gentry and elders. This was a 
matter of tax hike that created tension between county officials and local community 
from time to time. An arbitrary decision could provoke a popular outrage and resulted 
in the transfer or dismissal of the official involved. Third, the tax was fixed partly in 
silver and partly in grain. Therefore, whether tax burden was increased or not depended 
to a considerable extent on changes in the value of silver. When silver appreciated in 
value, taxpayers would find their burden rising even the amount they paid remained the 
same as before. On the other hand, when silver depreciated, their burden could become 
lower even additional surcharges were imposed.22
In the second quarter of the 19th century China was in deflation coupled with 
markedly appreciation of silver. As silver appreciated in value, peasants had to sell 
much more of their crops in order to pay the same amount of taxes, of which the most 
important being the land tax. According to a study made by Usui Sachiko, the land tax 
per mu in Changshu County of Jiangsu increased from 0.613 to 1. 150. shi in terms of 
rice between 1798-99 and 1845, and from 0.293 to 0.454 dan in terms of cotton between
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1821-22 and 1845.23 This case shows a rise of tax burden for 88 per cent in the half 
century before 1845 and 55 per cent alone in the quarter century before then.
Many contemporary officials voiced their concern about the crushing weight of 
of taxation that the rising value of silver brought to bear upon the taxpayers. Zeng 
Guo fan, the architect of victory over the Taiping rebels, submitted a memorial on the 
worsening economic conditions of the people because of falling prices. He said that in 
the southeastern part of the country rice was sold in the earlier years at three taels per 
shi, but nowadays at merely one and a half taels. Hence, although the government did 
not raise the tax rate, the people paid in fact 100 per cent more than they did before. 
Another official, Miu Zi, memorialised in 1849 that the appreciation of silver and the 
cheapness of rice had made land taxation then twice as heavy as in the 1820s and thrice 
as heavy as in the previous century.24
As silver became increasingly scarce, people usually made payment in copper 
cash at the rate of conversion set by the local government. The conversion rate 
inevitably went up along with appreciation of silver because public revenue and 
spending were all recorded in silver. This produced a vicious cycle in which many 
taxpayers defaulted on tax payment or refused to pay outright and local officials found 
taxes falling short. When hard pressed, not infrequently people turned to open revolt 
against public authorities, as happened in a good number of communities in Hunan, 
Fujian, Zhejiang in the 1840s.25 It is worthwhile to note a brief conversation left in the 
diary of a scholar, Wang Shiduo, when he took refuge in the countryside at the time of 
Taiping Rebellion:26
‘Are local officials corrupt’? he asked local residents.
‘Don’t know”.
‘Why you hate them, then?’
‘Because o f land taxes they collected’.
These few lines underscore the sentiment o f popular discontent against local officials 
brought about by rising tax burden.
The economic blow was the heaviest in an area such as the Yangzi delta. Ever 
since the 12th century the delta has been economically the most advanced in the 
country. It was, in the first place, the centre o f the textile industry, the foremost 
industry in Qing China. And, located at the confluence o f the three most important 
trunklines o f transportation - the Yangzi River, the Grand Canal, and the coastal 
waterway - the delta emerged as the country’s largest centre o f shipping and finance as 
well (see Map 1). Here cities and towns proliferated. A higher proportion o f population 
made their living outside farming and as such their income was by and large higher than 
elsewhere in the country. “Above there is heaven, down (on earth) there are Suzhou and 
Hangzhou”, (two most prosperous cities in the delta), so came a popular saying. 
Secondly, in few other areas o f the country was the economic wellbeing o f peasants so 
closely tied to the market. Cash crops and handicraft production were the mainstay of 
their household economy. In Songjiang and Taicang, for example, as much as 70 per 
cent o f farmland was used for growing cotton and only 30 per cent for rice; virtually all 
peasant households engaged in spinning or weaving. In Suzhou, Huzhou, Jiaxing, and 
Hangzhou their income depended primarily on planting mulberry trees, raising cocoons, 
and reeling silk. In other words, most o f what they produced was for sale in the market 
instead o f self-consumption.
In times o f business contraction the more an area is self-sufficient, the less 
affected it is by market vicissitudes. On the other hand, in such a highly commercialised 
area like the Yangzi delta where the livelihood o f people was closely intertwined with 
the market, business downturn could not but produce serious consequences. In the early
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19th century, as noted before, peasants could not recover the cost of production even 
though both crops of silk cocoon and cotton were abundant. The contraction of market 
resulted in drastic weakening of their purchasing power. In its turn, the decline of their 
purchasing power further diminished trade and various kinds of industrial employment. 
In the mid-century the delta was so depressed that, as observed by Wang Shiduo, many 
people could neither raise money to pursue business, nor could they find way out to 
make a living.27 Under the circumstances, some were compelled to borrow or sell 
property, and many more to become beggars or join the rebels.
Map 1: The Yangzi Delta
Moreover, as the commercial and industrial centre o f the country, the economy 
of the delta was most monetised. Businesses, big or small, were more heavily 
dependent on money for liquidity than any other area in the country. As pointed out 
before, Qing monetary system was bimetallic. Money supply depended essentially on 
the production and import/export o f the two kinds o f metal in question. The 
government was, however, incapable o f adjusting money supply to cope with economic 
fluctuations. In so far as the silver sector is concerned, the government adopted 
primarily a policy o f laissez-faire toward the circulation o f the white metal; no silver 
coins were issued before 1890. Since silver mines were insignificant at home, the 
supply o f silver depended largely upon import. Therefore, the amount o f silver in 
circulation expanded as streams o f the white metal found its way into China. On the 
other hand, the amount in circulation decreased in times o f silver outflow. As regards 
the cash sector, although the government had the monopoly over the issue o f copper 
cash, it was unable to stop counterfeiting and illegal melting because o f administrative 
inefficiency and poor minting technology. As a result, to a certain extent the circulation 
o f copper cash also fell beyond the control o f the government. In addition, in the later 
part o f the eighteenth century privately issued paper notes backed by either silver or 
copper cash (or simply by the credit o f the issuing merchants) made their appearance.
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While paper notes augmented the supply of money and added some degree of flexibility 
to Qing monetary system, there were few regulations to govern the new development, 
either. How did the different kinds of money work together in the market largely 
dependent upon local conventions and economic conditions, in the early 19th century 
three monetary regimes gradually took shape with each dominant over a large part of the 
country.
In the early nineteenth century China may be roughly divided into three 
monetary areas: North China where the regime of copper cash and copper notes 
prevailed; South China where silver, copper cash, and paper notes (in silver or copper 
cash) formed a regime of troika; and the Far West, economically the most backward, 
where the traditional regime of silver and, in particular, copper cash dominated (see 
Map 2). Of the three areas the South was the richest and most advanced. Before 1850 it 
produced virtually all of the goods (tea, silk, cotton cloth, porcelain) for export abroad 
and supplied most industrial goods for the rest of the country. As such it called for a 
monetary regime which was flexible enough to meet the transaction requirements of all 
kinds of trade. Therefore, silver, copper cash, silver notes, and copper notes all played a 
positive role in the market. The North experienced some extent of economic 
development, but its silver stock was inadequate. Although, as the seat of the central 
government, Beijing received large amounts of silver in the form of taxes from southern 
provinces, most flowed back primarily because the North purchased much more from 
the South than the other way round in the two-way trade. On the other hand, the two 
central mints in Beijing turned out annually about a half of the copper cash officially 
struck throughout the nation. Therefore, copper cash and copper notes supported by 
cash or silver become the most common instruments for trading transactions and debt 
clearance.28
Map 2: M onetary A reas in Early Nineteenth Century China
What we are concerned about here is the impact o f silver drain upon different 
monetary areas. When silver took flight en mass, it was the South that felt the pinch 
most painfully. First, the area held most o f silver stock in the country and business 
transactions depended most heavily on the availability o f silver. Inevitably, the white 
metal that flowed out o f the country came mostly out o f the stock held in the South and 
therefore this area suffered the most from liquidity crisis. Second, when large quantities 
o f silver disappeared from the market, the circulation o f paper notes diminished even 
more as a result o f multiplication effect. Third, in order to preserve their purchasing 
power people increasingly withdraw silver from circulation. We are told by a keen 
contemporary observer that “The wealthy keep on hoarding silver and thus silver 
diminishes daily”.29 These exacerbated the crisis o f  liquidity and further exerted
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downward pressure on prices. It is not surprising to see why many businesses collapsed 
and most lines of trade decreased by a half (Feng Guifen’s observation noted above).
In North China the deflationary impact was much less profound because not 
only was it less commercialised but also the value of copper cash, the most common 
circulating media there, happened to be relatively stable in the early 19th century. This 
observation is supported by the data on retail prices in Daliu, as shown in Table 4. 
Given 1833-35 as the base period, retail prices in silver drop to 66 while those in copper 
cash even move up slightly to 107. These differences may explain, to a certain extent, 
why the Taiping rebels played havoc in the south (particularly the Yangzi delta) but 
failed to extend their control to the North.
Finally, it should be noted that the delta's share of the land tax was far out of 
proportion in terms of land acreage. As noted before, the land tax quota was fixed 
partly in silver and partly in grain. The data in Table 5 indicate that the registered 
acreage of the delta accounts for 6 per cent of total registered acreage in the empire in 
1820, but its share of the land tax quota amounts to 12 per cent for the part in silver 
known as diting (literally, “the land tax and labor services”) and as much as 36 per cent 
for the part in grain. In fact, since the government never carried out a cadastral survey, 
vast tracts of land, particularly in the developing area and on the frontier, went 
unregistered. If cultivated acreage rather than registered acreage is taken into account, 
the delta’s share of total acreage would be even smaller.30 On the basis of my estimate 
for 1753, Bernhardt arrived at the average tax collected per mu as follows: 0.2783 tael 
(silver) and 0. 1637 shi (rice) for the Yangzi delta in contrast to 0.0713 tael and 0.0475 
shi respectively nationwide?31 That is to say, the land tax burden per mu in the delta 
was three to four times the national average in the middle of the nineteenth century.
Table 5: Registered Acreage and Land Tax in the Yangzi Delta, 1820
Area Silver Grain Registered Acreage
(teal) (shi) (mu)
South Jiangsu 2,442,025 2,148,163 30,280,964
North Zhejiang 1,222,208 1,120,704 15,486,873
Sum as percentage of 3,644,233 3,268,867 45,767,837
National Total 12.6 36.44 5.99
National Total 30,206,144 8,971,681 764,612,711
Source: Liang Fangzhong, Zhongguo Lidai hukou tiandi tainfu tongji (Statistics on population, land 
acreage, and land taxes for successive dynasties in China), Shanghai: Shanghai Remin chubanshe, 1980, 
pp. 401-413.
Southern Jiangsu includes Suzhou, Songjiang, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, Jiangning, and Taicangzhou; 
Northern Zhejiang includes Hangzhou, Jiaxing and Huzhou.
In Suzhou and Songfiang the land yield was, average speaking, roughly two shi 
o f rice per mu and rent amounted to a half, i.e., one shi per mu.32 As noted earlier, 
landowners had to pay an amount o f tax equivalent to 0.613 shi o f rice per mu in or 
Changshu, a county in Suzhou Prefecture. That is about a third o f the yield. By 1845 
the tax had increased to 1.150 shi per mu. In other words, a landowner had to surrender 
to the government more than a half o f what he produced if  he him self fanned the land; 
the rent could not even cover the tax bill if  he chose leasing out.
The burden o f land taxation was much lighter in other areas, however. Take 
Hunan, for example. While pointing out doubling o f tax burden as a result o f falling 
prices o f rice, Luo Binchang, Governor o f Hunan, said in a memorial submitted at the 
height o f the Taiping Rebellion:33
Peasants sell rice for copper cash in order to obtain silver. To obtain a tael o f silver 
they have sell five shi o f the unhusked rice. Those who owned 100 mu o f land can 
receive rent for 100 shi o f the unhusked rice. To pay for die land tax (for 100 mu) they
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have to sell 20 shi (of the unhusked rice). Rice prices are depressed and peasants suffer.
The resentment o f people is running high.
According to his report, the land tax consumed a fifth of rent or 10 per cent of land yield 
in Hunan. But Hunanese resentment “is running high” because their burden then was 
much heavier than before. How much more angry should be their brethren down in the 
Yangzi delta who had to yield to the government a half of what they produced for land 
tax payment?
What made the burden of taxation even more onerous to peasants was the 
regressiveness of tax structure. In many provinces local governments divided the 
taxpayers into two groups - the gentry households or big households (the well-to-do) 
and commoner households or samil households (small property owners) and imposed a 
higher rate on the latter than the former.34 The lopsided tax structure was particularly 
serious in the Yangzi delta. Feng Guifen, a prominent scholar-gentry in Suzhou, left a 
vivid account on the regressive nature of the grain tribute, a part of the land tax in kind 
designated for delivery to the court in Beijing:35
Under the present rule for the payment of the grain tribute, the amount required of a 
taxpayer depends on his status: high or low, powerful or weak. Not only was the rate 
of tax different between the gentry and commoners, but also different from one gentry 
to another and from one commoner to another .... For the gentry households, the rate 
starts from 1.2-1.3 shi for each shi o f tax quota and is progressively increased; the 
highest is twice the quota. For the commoner households, the weakest pay ... 3-4 shi for 
each shi o f tax quota, the powerful ones more than 2 shi, and those particularly 
powerful less than 2 shi.
Many peasants would feel this kind of discrimination intolerable even in times of 
economic prosperity. In the second quarter of the 19th century they found themselves 
increasingly unable to keep their head above water, the crushing weight of taxation 
exacerbated their feeling of alienation. Is it little wonder that few of them support the 
Manchu regime when the Taiping rebels marched down the Yangzi River to the delta?
Not satisfied with the two prevailing theses - the Multhusian and the Marxist - 
on the mass peasant uprisings in mid-19th century China, I propose in this paper to look 
at the issue in the light of deflation. What 1 am attempting to do is to answer the 
following three questions: first, whether the value of silver kept rising and prices in 
terms of silver declining in the second quarter of the 19th century? Should the answer be 
positive, how did these changes affect the economy? Second, how did Chinese peasants 
suffer from the early 19th century deflation? Third, what impact did the deflation 
produce upon the Yangzi delta, the richest and the most commercialised area of the 
country and the stronghold of the Taiping regime of which most followers were poor 
peasants?
Here is a brief summary o f my findings. In the early 19th century and in its 
second quarter in particular, there appeared a clear trend o f rising value o f silver, then a 
major component o f China’s monetary system. The trend manifested itself in the rate of 
exchange between silver and copper cash, another major component o f the circulating 
media in the market, and in prices o f grain and other commodities. At the beginning of 
the second quarter the exchange rate stood around 1,200 cash to a tael; by the end it had 
climbed to the level o f 2,000. During the same period, prices dropped by a third in the 
country. The decline o f prices brought about a contraction o f trade along the coast and 
in the interior as well. Many businesses collapsed and employment diminished. The 
more commercialised was an area, the more did its economy suffer.
The rise o f silver value and the fall o f prices affected the wellbeing o f peasants 
in three aspects. First o f all, in times o f deflation prices o f farm products declined more 
than those o f non-farm goods. Thus the terms o f trade turned against them. In other 
words, they found their purchasing power diminishing because o f the working o f what
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Adam Smith called the invisible hand. Between 1830s and 1850 their purchasing power 
decreased by more than a fifth. Next, their income from handicraft production and off­
season employment shrank or could be even completely cut off when deflation set in. 
Moreover, their tax burden became heavier along with appreciation in the value of 
silver. This is because most taxes were fixed in silver. When silver appreciated, 
peasants had to sell more of what they produced in order to pay the same amount of 
taxes. In light of the reports submitted by contemporary officials and a case study, taxes 
in terms of grain probably doubled over the first half of the 19th century.
The triple blow that hit peasants at the time gave rise to popular discontent and 
mass uprisings. In the Yangzi delta the disaffection of peasants was particularly strong 
because they suffered the most from deflation. They suffered the most because they 
were most dependent on market; as market contracted their income declined sharply. 
Moreover, as China’s the commercial, industrial, and financial centre, the delta held 
most of silver stock in the country; its circulating media consisted mostly of silver and 
paper notes supported by silver. When silver flowed out en mass, the delta was inflicted 
by a liquidity crisis of extraordinary dimension. North China, on the other hand, fared 
much better because not only its economy was less commercialised but also prices in 
terms of copper cash were rather stable there (note that copper cash and copper notes 
being the prevailing media in circulation in the North). Finally, the delta’s burden of 
land taxation was the heaviest in the country. Its share of the total land tax was 12 per 
cent for the part in silver and as much as 36 per cent in grain though its registered land a 
mere 6 per cent of the nation’s total. In Suzhou peasants had to surrender over a half of 
what they produced to pay off their tax bills. In contrast, the proportion was only 10 per 
cent for the Hunanese. Isn’t it small wonder that peasants in the delta felt particularly 
disaffected toward the government, and that they offered little resistance when the 
Taiping rebels marched in, and that subsequently the Taiping regime held sway over the 
area for 15 years but failed to expand northward?
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